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During the mid-1980s the U.S. economy experienced the highest level
of corporate takeover activity since the late l960s, perhaps even since
before the Great Depression. As with the takeover boom of the sixties,
the recent one has brought after it a tide of legislation aimed at cor-
recting the perceived abuses and societalills generated by the
acquisitions.
It is natural to seek simple, common explanations for the different
waves of mergers the U.S. economy has experienced, but obvious
differences in the characteristics of these periods make such an effort
inadvisable. The recent takeover boom has exhibited many phenomena
not observed in the trust building of the early 1900s or in the conglom-
erate mergers of the 1960s, in particular, hostile takeovers and takeover
defenses, the acquisition of companies ranking among the largest in
the country, and the prevalence of cash as a means of payment for
acquired targets. Legislative initiatives have also changed, moving away
from concerns for competition and efficiency to concerns for the sta-
bility of the financial and tax systems and for the competing rights and
interests of shareholders, managers, employees, and other "stake-
holders" who are interested parties to the takeover process.
One of the clearest lessons of the recent period is that, whatever the
social gains generated by mergers and acquisitions, Large redistributions
are occurring simultaneously. It is therefore unrealistic to expect a
social consensus regarding whether mergers are "good" or "bad," but
it is also extremely important that "all" the costs and benefits of merg-
ers be evaluated if their overall value is to be understood. Weighing
the rights of different parties in a changing economic environment poses
such difficult problems of analysis that it is important to avoid the
additional burden of faulty information. Toward this goal of providing
1r
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betterinformation about a broad range of issues concerning mergers S
and acquisitions, the National Bureau of Economic Research launched tar1
a project on this subject in 1985. This volume reports the results of
ofthe research that project has generated. effi
Much of the empirical research to date on mergers and acquisitions fro
has focused on the financial aspects of takeovers. This research, with cut
its disinterested perspective, has offered a comprehensible version of
the story told in the popular business press through the experiences of to
the managers and investors involved in the takeover process. This is coi
one of the merits of such research. But most citizens are neither eco-
nomics professors nor CEOs or arbitrageurs, and the common view of COS
the takeover process is a very different, negative one that is dominated me
by very different issues and concerns. The first two chapters of this in 1
volume are devoted to these questions, foremost among which is the ma
impact of takeovers on the employees of acquired companies. pos
Charles Brown and James L. Medoff consider the impact of acqui- sen
sitions on the wages and employment of workers in a comprehensive pul
sample of Michigan companies during the years 1979—84. The authors
identify three main classes of changes in business control: changes only tho
in the identity of the company's owner ("simple sales"); outright sales Sh
of the company's assets ("assets-only sales"); and mergers, by which
two preexisting companies form a combined entity. Over the five-year tak
period 16 percent of all workers sampled were touched by one of the riz
three types of transactions, although only 4 percent experienced a log
merger. Moreover, the average number of employees of the combined prc
entity after merger was only 268 in 1984. These findings remind us that tak
there are many types of potentially disruptive business restructurings
besides mergers and acquisitions, and that the typical companies in- arg
volved are relatively small. fifli
For each of their three samples Brown and Medoff find that wages sha
and employment change in opposite directions around the event of fict
business ownership change, with employment increasing and wages exi
declining in simple sales and mergers and the opposite pattern being Ne
observed in the case of assets sales. Perhaps most important for the
current debate, however, is the relatively small magnitude of these
changes. Among the mergers that occurred in 1981—82, for example,
the wages of the combined work force fell by about 4 percent and the
employment rose by about 2 percent. This is not the stuff of which poi
plant-closing laws are made. tak
Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers argue in their chapter acç
that the large hostile takeovers that have been the subject of much firn
publicity in recent years are of a qualitatively different character than (rel
the mergers in the sample studied by Brown and Medoff, and that their do,
effects on labor are likely to be quite different, too. par3 Introduction
Shleifer and Summers make two basic points. First, the gains to
hed targetshareholders so well documented as occurring at the initiation
s of of a takeover bid (discussed in chapters 5and8) need not signal a pure
efficiency gain, but may well incorporate a large transfer component
ons from other stakeholders in the firm, such as employees who take pay
,ith cuts or suppliers who are forced to renegotiate contracts. Second,
i of hostile takeovers may generate efficiency losses of two types in addition
s of to whatever efficiency gains they achieve through the restructuring of
s is company operations.
co- The first type is the ex post inefficiency of increased transactions
of costs incurred in reorganizing the company. The second is the cx ante
ted inefficiency associated with the reduced ability of a firm to participate
his in long-term implicit contracts with its stakeholders because a raider
the may violate the contracts if it is in the interest of the shareholders, ex
post, to do so. This second type of inefficiency is potentially more
ui- serious than the first because of the spillover effects that a single, well-
lye publicized hostile takeover can have on the ability of other firms to
ors effectively commit themselves to honoring implicit contracts. The au-
Ily thors use the acquisitions of Trans World Airlines and Youngstown
es Sheet and Tube to support their propositions.
ch A frequent argument against hostile takeovers is that the threat of
ar takeover attempts forces incumbent managers to shorten planning ho-
he rizons that may already be too short from a social perspective. The
a logic of this position is that the stock market undervalues long-term
ed projects, particularly research and development, so that firms under-
iat taking such projects in the long-run interests of shareholders will suffer
gs low stock prices and be ripe for takeover attempts. A response to this
in- argument is that the stock market is rationally valuing the shares of
firms whose managers are expanding operations by reinvesting the
es shareholders' money in projects with negative present value. It is dif-
of ficult to evaluate these alternative views because the payoff to R&D
es expenditures comes only after many years andis difficult to measure.
ng Nevertheless, the next two chapters do provide insight into this im-
portant question.
Sc Examining a sample of all publicly traded U.S. manufacturing cor-
e, porations acquired between 1976 and 1986, Bronwyn H. Hall considers
the role played by R&D activity in the takeover process. Of 603 cor-
th porations taken over, 332 were acquired by other U.S. firms, 199 were
taken private, and 72 were acquired by foreign parents. In recent years
er acquisitions have been concentrated in low-technology industries. Hall
finds that there is no difference discernible in R&D expenditure levels
in (relative to firm size) of firms acquired and firms not acquired by public
ir domestic corporations and that firms acquired by foreign or private
parents are likely to have lower than average R&D activity. Although4 Alan J. Auerbach
parentcompanies tend to have lower R&D expenditure levels than to
their targets, there is no evidence of a drop in the combined levels of reas
R&D expenditures after the merger occurs. that
Randall Andrei Shlelfer. and Robert W. Vishny also relate SO
the characteristics of firms to the likelihood of acquisition. Their sample imp
is the 454 publicly traded companies on the Fortune 500 list in 1980. sha
The authors find that 82 of these companies were acquired or taken
private between 198? and 1985, and they classify 40 of these takeovers pro
as hostile and 42 as friendly, based on the way in which the takeover Sec
process began. They do find that the companies subject to hostile ant
acquisitions had low ratios of market value to assets, both in absolute tha
terms and relative to other firms in their industries. But these firms oni
had a lower average growth rate and rate of investment than both the
sample of all firms and the subsample of firms acquired in friendly the
transactions. Slow growth is certainly not a characteristic one asso- tax
ciates with high R&D expenditures. tax
Shleifer, and Vishny also find that targets acquired in hostile
transactions had a lower fraction of equity ownership by the top two
officers and a smaller likelihood that a member of the founding family for
was on the management team than firms not acquired. On the other ac
hand ownership by the top officers, ownership by the board, and the en
presence of a founding family member were all much more common In
in friendly transactions. These findings suggest that firms whose man-
agers' interests are more closely aligned with those of their shareholders sa
are less likely to be the targets of hostile acquisitions. ra
Whatever their effects on the behavior of corporate managers, hostile m
takeover attempts have a clear and immediate impact on the well-being b(
of shareholders. Richard S. Ruback presents in his chapter an analysis St
of 33 failed takeover attempts between 1963 and 1979 of firms listed di
on the New York and American stock exchanges. Some of these firms ta
were ultimately acquired by other bidders, others were not. Ruback p
finds that the average gain in share prices associated with initial bids d
was about 31 percent. (An interesting aspect of this gain is that nearly
one third of it accrued during the nine-day period ending a day before U
the public announcement of the takeover bid, indicating a substantial
amount of as the use of inside information has euphemisti- C
cally been called.) This percentage is consistent with earlier findings
about takeover premia. Ruback also finds, however, that the subse-
U
quent announcement of a takeover bid termination results in a loss in
share prices averaging 11 percent for the sample as a whole.
Why don't share prices drop by the full amount of the original take- b
over premia? Two additional pieces of evidence are that, for firms not
eventually acquired, the loss with a terminated bid is larger, 17 percent, r
and that, after the termination announcement, share prices continue F5Introduction
ian to fall over a longer period of time. These findings suggest that one
of reason for the incomplete drop in share prices upon a termination is
that shareholders expect that the firm, once "put in play," may remain
ate so. Firms less likely to do so experience a larger drop in price. Several
pie important questions remain unanswered. First, what fraction of the
80 share price gains are "permanent," that is, not associated with in-
er; creased residual takeover prospects but perhaps with managerial im-
ers provements initiated in response to the initial, unsuccessful bids?
'er Second, does resistance to takeovers increase shareholder wealth, ex
ile ante, by increasing the price of successful bids by a greater proportion
ite than it reduces the likelihood of success? One cannot know by looking
ms only at the "failures."
he An argument against takeovers is that they are often tax driven, that
the private gains realized by investors may be at the expense of other
0- taxpayers.The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced two of the important
tax incentives to merge: the ability to use the accumulated tax losses
ile and credits of acquired companies to shield a company's own taxable
income; and the opportunity to step up the bases of depreciable assets
ily for tax purposes without paying capital gains taxes. Despite the en-
Ler actment of this legislation, however, there has been an absence of
he empirical evidence on the importance of these and other tax benefits
Mi indriving merger activity.
n- In the chapter written by David Reishus and me, we compare a
rs sample of 316 mergers and acquisitions involving large public corpo-
rations with a random sample of similar-size companies that did not
merge, over the years 1968—83. We find that the average estimated tax
benefits from combining were similar in the two samples, which con-
is stitutes fairly strong evidence that tax factors were not the major force
driving the mergers. Only in cases in which companies with unused
Is tax losses and credits acquired taxable companies (takeovers that were
generally unaffected by the provisions of the 1986 act) was there a
Is discernible impact of taxes on merger activity, but the impact was small
relative to the aggregate level of mergers. In addition, we did not
re uncoversignificant changes in combined debt-equity ratios among the
al merging firms in our sample, relative to the changes observed in our
control sample. This suggests that, at least until the past few years,
the tax advantage associated with interest deductibility did not play an
important role in fostering takeovers by large public corporations.
n Beginning in 1984 a startling phenomenon arose in the U.S. non-
financial corporate sector. In that year (according to statistics compiled
by the Federal Reserve Board), and in 1985 and 1986 as well, net issues
of new equity were markedly negative, as share repurchases exceeded
new issues by about $80 billion in each year. Those alarmed by this
e process have called it the "deequitization of America," although the
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coincidentrise in corporate debt-equity ratios over these same years F
was muted by the rising stock market. thei
Share repurchases are rising not onLy because more firms are pur- a hi
chasing their own shares, but also because more purchases of shares
in corporate acquisitions are being cash-financed. The growth of these auti
activities in recent years is explored in the chapter by Laurie Simon gen
Bagwell and John B. Shoven. As they discuss, a well-known puzzle is but
why firms subject their shareholders to ordinary income taxes on div- in s
idends when they could use other methods to distribute cash from the
corporate sector at favorable capital gains treatment. A possible ex- act
planation for cash-financed acquisitions has been the "trapped equity"
view stating that firms encounter difficulty repurchasing their own shares an
and are therefore led to repurchase the shares of other firms instead, in t
Yet some firms do engage in massive purchases of their own equity, the
and so it is important to understand what leads some firms to do this tin
and others to engage in cash acquisitions. Re
Bagwell and Shoven analyze repurchase and acquisition behavior in as
both 1976 and 1984. Among other results, they find that in both years be
firms with low ratios of market to book value and high ratios of cash on
flow to assets were more likely than other firms to repurchase their du
own shares, and that a low market to book ratio is also important in co
explaining acquisitions. Perhaps most important, however, are their to
findings that the most important predictor of whether a firm will engage th
in either activity is whether it did so in the previous year, that having St
previously engaged in one activity increases the predicted probability
of engaging in the other as well, and that the behavioral equations for u
the 1976 and 1984 samples are not statistically different, even though p
aggregate behavior changed in the intervening years. Future research ti
must gain a better understanding of the underlying factors causing b
persistent differences in the behavior of firms that the authors refer to
as the "habit formation." 0
Evidence on the changing use of cash to finance mergers and ac- L
quisitions is provided by JuLian R. Franks, Robert S. Harris and Cohn P
Mayer, who study a sample of over 2,500 takeovers in the United States II
andthe United Kingdom over the years 1955—85. The cross-national C
comparison is also valuable because the two countries differ in their
tax treatment of cash acquisitions and in other laws regarding take-
overs. The authors confirm that the use of cash as a means of payment
in U.S. mergers and acquisitions has exhibited a strongly increasing
trend over time, but that has not been true in Great Britain. The authors •1
argue that the pattern of cash acquisitions in Britain has not been
consistent with the predictions of the "trapped equity" view of cash-
financed merger activity, even though that the government's historical
prohibition of own-share repurchases makes this view more plausible
for Britain than for the United States.1 introduction
ars Franks, Harris, and Mayer uncover several interesting patterns in
their sample. They find that, in both countries, cash acquisitions carry
ur- a higher average premium for target shareholders than do stock ac-
•es quisitions. This result may be explained by tax or nontax factors. The
authors also discover that the shareholders of acquiring U.K. firms
on generally receive no benefit (or loss) as the result of the acquisition,
is but that acquiring U.S. shareholders gain in cash acquisitions but lose
iv- in stock acquisitions. These findings defy simple explanation, but they
he raise important questions about the economic motivations of takeover
activity.
y" An even longer historical perspective is offered by Devra L. Golbe
es and Lawrence J. White, who compare the intensity of merger activity
Ld. in the 1980s to that in earlier periods of high activity. The authors reject
ty, the argument that there have been no merger "waves," but at the same
time suggest that the current wave is not large by historical standards.
I Relativeto the size of the economy, the current wave is about as large
in as that of the late l960s. A much larger wave of activity emerged
rs between the end of World War I and the Depression, and an even larger
sh one took place around the turn of the century. Unlike the experience
jr during the earliest of these periods, no noticeable change in industrial
in concentration has accompanied the recent merger waves. From 1963
jr to 1982, for example, the fractions of value added accounted for by
ge the largest 50,100,and 200 manufacturing companies were nearly con-
stant. And the results are similar for the private sector as a whole.
ty Golbe and White attempt to explain the recent peak in merger activity
or using a variety of hypotheses. They find, however, that the only im-
portant explanatory variable for the aggregate level of activity, given
the size of the economy, is the value of the stock market relative to
book value.
to The final contribution to this volume is a panel discussion by econ-
omists who have participated in U.S. policymaking in recent years.
Leading off the discussion of the implications for the economy of recent
in policy actions, Joseph A. Grundfest and Gregg Jarrell review the recent
insider-trading scandals and speculate about the effects of pending
changes in securities regulations. Steven C. Salop explores the ration-
ir ale of recent antitrust policy, as does Lawrence White, who also looks
at the special problems in the banking and thrift industry.
it Together the contributions in this volume present many important
findings about the causes and consequences of takeovers. Perhaps the
most important message they convey is that one should not look for a
n simple "bottom line" result from a class of transactions that vary so
much in their size, method of financing, motivation, overall economic
LI impact, and distributional effects.
C—
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